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1Making Coups History
Charles Sampford1
Introduction
International support is capable of making the difference between the successful 
defense of democracy and its ignominious defeat. Indeed, the perceived probability 
of both support for democratically chosen leaders and opposition to their attackers 
can fundamentally shift the balance in the domestic struggle between them.
Nevertheless, although changes to international law and international relations justify 
a greater international role in preventing and deterring coups and erosions, not all 
responsibility for protecting democracy should be assigned to the international 
community. Indeed, the first line of defense should be a democracy’s own domestic 
initiatives, with the main role of the international community being to support a 
domestic response to threats to democracy. 
However, international support can be crucial to the survival of democracy, 
particularly when it is thought that domestic responses will be ineffective in isolation.
Not for the first time in international affairs, the greater the resolve of democratic 
nations to act, the less likely they will be called on to do so. The less resolute the 
community of democracies2, the more likely that individual democracies will be 
challenged -- and the more likely that other democracies will have to face dilemmas, 
messy decisions, and violent outcomes. 
Threats to democracy involve officeholders’ abuse of the official powers given to 
them within a democracy through the unconstitutional extension of those powers 
either temporally or substantively. This abuse is most dramatic in a coup d’état. The 
traditional coup occurs when one part of the state attempts to take over other organs 
of the state using force or the threat of force. Because the military represents that 
part of the state meant to control a monopoly of force,3 the military is the most 
frequent -- but not the only -- culprit. Other kinds of coups could occur if a head of 
government uses unconstitutional means to dismiss judges who deliver unwelcome 
judgments (what Dr. Mort Halperin calls an “auto-coup”), or to get rid of an 
“uncontrollable” legislature in order to rule by decree instead (another form of auto-
coup). A distinct but functionally similar threat is of the erosion of democracy, where
officials abuse their constitutional powers to take over gradually the powers of other 
institutions, as in Zimbabwe.
The two kinds of threats may be causally related. Erosions of democracy, whether 
real or claimed, may be used as a justification for coups, and certainly dampen 
domestic and international opposition to coups, even though coups are hardly good 
examples of governance and rarely lead to improvements in governance. More 
1 Professor Sampford is Foundation Professor of Law at Griffith University, having been its Foundation Dean. 
He is currently the Director of IEGL, The Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law (a joint initiative of the UN 
University, Griffith and QUT in association with the ANU). The assistance of Melea Lewis, a Senior Research 
Assistant, in editing this essay is most appreciated.
2 Whether informally in lower case or formally through the Community of Democracies established by the 2000 
Warsaw Declaration.
3 Police are lightly armed and much less numerous.
2worryingly, improvements in governance, which generally strengthen democratic 
institutions, actually may stimulate a coup by the military or some other powerful 
grouping that stands to lose out as a result of such improvements.
While well-established democracies regard coups and erosions within their own 
borders as intolerable attacks against the sovereignty of the people, they have 
traditionally given little more than a rebuke when such attacks have occurred in other, 
more-fragile democracies. Nevertheless, the international community does possess
various tools and approaches to respond to threats to the institutions and officials of 
a given democracy. Among them, however, the first and primary duty is to support 
domestic anti-coup measures.
The Fragility of Coups
There are many who find coups, especially in democracies, repugnant, or at least 
distasteful. However, they assume that there is nothing that can be done about them.
It is easy to see why this assumption is so widely held. According to Weber4, the 
state possesses a monopoly of force, which lies overwhelmingly in the hands of the 
armed forces. If the armed forces, then, turn that force against the rest of the state in 
order to take it over, they “must get through.”5 Indeed, S.E. Finer6 saw the key 
question as why the military did not seize power more often, and permanently.
In fact, it is not at all obvious that coups will succeed, and some can hang in the 
balance for considerable periods of time. This is because coups are not nearly as 
simple as may be imagined. A successful coup depends on a mass of individual 
decisions being made by an inter-dependent and inter-related set of officials and 
subordinates. Until a sufficient number of individuals in the relevant positions have 
made these decisions, any coup remains precarious.
These decision-makers will be motivated by several factors: coercion by the rebels,
anticipated reactions of the coup participants, personal support or abhorrence for the
rebel cause, personal support for the outgoing regime, expectations of how others 
will react (and hence of the coup’s chances for success), and the legal consequences 
of collaboration or inactivity should the coup fail.
Coups rely on an active few and a passive or compliant many, and unless and until 
sufficient individuals in key positions remain passive or become compliant, the
outcome of the coup is uncertain. In fact, coups should be even more precarious than 
they are. Because of the need for secrecy, most coup leaders only mobilize a fraction 
of the total force available within a state. The remainder, if effectively mobilized in 
opposition to the coup, could usually crush the forces that are party to the conspiracy. 
This should make coups not only precarious, but impossible. 
It is only a combination of two phenomena that allow them to succeed -- the isolation 
in which most actors must decide whether or not to take part, and the general 
4 M Weber (1946) ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in From Max Weber: Essays in sociology (trans HH Gerth and CW 
Mills) Oxford University Press, p 78.
5 As it was assumed in the 1930s that ‘the bomber must always get through’
6 S. E. Finer (1976) The Man on Horseback: the Role of the Military in Politics, 2nd Ed, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin.
3perception that the coup will succeed. The confusion generated by coups means that 
many key individuals have to decide whether to accept or resist the coup in isolation 
of others. This leads to what I have called the “dilemma of the lone actor,” or the 
isolated decision-maker who must ask him- or herself: What can any one individual 
hope to accomplish alone?
Edmund Burke’s words could not ring more true: “When bad men combine, the good 
must associate; else they will fall, one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible 
struggle.”7 When military officers conspire to commit treason, those who are opposed 
to them need to combine as well. They need to appreciate that in combination, they 
can succeed -- and that only in combination can they succeed. A coup can be 
defeated if those who oppose it are prepared to act, together.
Outline of a Countercoup Strategy
A countercoup strategy for democratic states should make it easier for “good men to 
associate.” The more credible such a strategy appears, the more it will erode the 
perception that the coup will succeed. Such a strategy should take into account the 
actions that are required and the decisions that have to be made by many individuals 
before a coup can succeed. It should then seek to shift the balance in such a way as 
to increase the likelihood that those in a position to make those decisions will oppose 
the coup in the ways available to them.
In general terms, any successful coup must go through eight stages:
1. Genesis. The perceived grievances must develop.
2. Planning. The inner core must plan the course of the coup.
3. Recruiting. Key military leaders must be recruited.
4. Seizing key points. Physical control must be established through seizure of key 
areas.
5. Neutralizing. Ensuring -- whether by persuasion, confusion or threat -- that the 
remainder of the armed forces do not intervene. 
6. Taking over unarmed institutions. Civil servants and judges must do as they are 
told.
7. Coping with international response. Leaders must fend off international 
criticism, sanctions, or worse.
8. Participating in international trade. Without the ability to be accepted as a state 
in the international community, and the concomitant ability to participate in 
international trade, it is not clear that the coup could succeed. 
A successful countercoup strategy involves a number of elements and various sub-
strategies for ensuring that the army and other state institutions are more difficult to 
hijack. As such, it involves both “hard” and “soft” strategies. The soft strategies 
involve general improvements in ethics, governance, cultural changes, a strong civil 
society, and the improvement of the economic lot of citizens who might support a 
coup. These are generally long-term means of reducing the motivation and general 
support for coups. They also involve developing an effective rhetoric to ensure that 
7 E. Burke, (1926) “Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents,” in E. J. Payne, ed., Select Works of 
Edmund Burke: Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents and the Two Speeches on America, vol. 3,
Oxford, Clarendon Press.
4coups are viewed in a very negative light, as a treasonous and corrupt abuse of 
powers granted for the purpose of protecting that people’s democratic institutions.
The hard strategies are those that recognize that we are dealing with hard men for 
whom good governance is a threat rather than a promise. Hard strategies seek to 
respond to the tough-mindedness of coup-makers by threatening to mobilize an 
overwhelming response to the coup and by making it next to impossible for coup-
makers to take over the administration and effectively exercise state power.
The Military
As the military provide both the resources for the attempted takeover of the state and 
its first line of defense, it is clearly a crucial institution. Four factors critically affect 
which of these two opposed activities it is more likely to pursue -- recruitment, 
structure, military law and training.
- Armies should be careful not to recruit soldiers or officers from a single class, party, 
ethnic group, or any other group that could end up in conflict with other groups within 
the relevant society.
- Military law should make the responsibilities of soldiers clear. Soldiers should 
clearly understand that not only are orders to engage in a coup d’état illegal, but that 
they have a duty to respond to such orders in the same way as they would to an 
invading force. 
- Military law should clearly require the reporting of any plots, and criminalize the 
failure to do so as constituting “misprision of treason.”
- Military ethics, military honor and military training should reinforce the above as well 
as the values that underlie it, including democracy and the rule of law.
The Unarmed Institutions of the State
The secret to successfully defeating a coup, like the secret to effectively mounting 
one, lies in the ability to mobilize and, especially, coordinate supporters.8 This 
requires clear rules to determine the responsibilities of each official, and/or clear lines 
of communication and authority to give updated instructions as to the most effective 
response for loyal officials to make.
Emergency legislation should establish clear alternate lines of authority so that, 
whatever fate befalls the leaders of the government, there is always a replacement 
official with the authority to decide how loyal subordinate officials should act. At least 
some of those replacements should be overseas9 and hence out of the reach of 
potential coup-makers.
Action by the International Community
International collective action should initially include diplomatic pressure and offers of 
mediation as well as continuing recognition of, and support for, the democratic 
regime -- and total non-recognition of any regime that attempts to overthrow it.  
8 See E Luttwak (1969) Coup d’état: a practical handbook, Alfred E Knopf; C Malaparte (1948) Technique du
Coup d’Etat (trans. from the Italian by J Bertrand), Grasset.
9 For example, the state’s ambassador to the United Nations.
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coup. Its embassies can provide temporary asylum for government members. As a 
pre-emptive measure, allies that provide military training can try to imbue graduates 
with appropriate attitudes and values. Non-military aid can also be suspended and 
economic sanctions applied, with allies pressing other allies and third countries to join 
in.
If a democratically elected government is overthrown and some or all of its members 
flee the country, they should be supported by friendly governments as the 
government-in-exile. The international community should, however, pay attention to 
the quality of the overthrown government. It may be argued that the democratic 
credentials of the ousted regime had been damaged. 
If this were the case, then the international assistance would be conditional on any 
such damages being rectified and dealt with through constitutional processes. If the 
ultimate constitutional court is still intact, then it can provide determinations. If not, the 
international community will have to find some other body which can dispense 
constitutional determinations. Even if the former government paid limited regard to 
such determinations, the international community can certainly insist on it doing so in 
future.
Aid
Apart from political and diplomatic attention, it is likely that coups can be averted 
through better-targeted aid to overcome uneven levels of development that 
concentrate wealth in some groups at the expense of others. Rather than focusing on 
sanctions after a coup, our aim in future should be to develop more effective models 
for aid delivery before one occurs.
Further, it could be argued that developed countries offer costly military training at the 
expense of essential training for the military’s civilian superiors. The emphasis should 
be reversed. Strong civilian control is dependent upon the existence of a civilian 
bureaucracy and government ministers experienced and knowledgeable in military 
matters. There is also reason for considering more effective training for civilian police, 
who are better placed to handle domestic unrest. This would also help ensure that 
the military’s focus remains externally focused. Finally, the building of a strong civil 
society is essential -- in particular a strong judiciary.
Recognition Policy in the United Nations
The U.N. Credentials Committee, or another representative U.N. group, should be 
given a mandate to establish whether a particular government is a representative 
one. If a country were disaccredited altogether (and this is possible),10
10 The committee has a number of choices concerning the outcome of its deliberations – including deferring the 
decision and letting the seat remain vacant.
it would not be 
able to participate in the General Assembly. International isolation and associated 
damage can impact on the regime, as can the withdrawal by international 
organizations of financial assistance. Consideration should be given to the loss of 
6jurisdictional immunities and the right to sue in the name of the Member State 
domestically and internationally.11
Coercive Intervention: Sanctions and Military Intervention
Sanctions 
The Security Council can authorize and mandate collective sanctions under Chapter 
VII if it determines that there is a threat to peace and security. The effectiveness of 
sanctions is open to debate, however, and, unless carefully chosen, they have the 
potential to create great hardship among the population. Sanctions in the form of an 
effective refusal by all or most states to accord the delinquent state the benefits of 
membership in the international community are probably the most effective and 
devastating response, with an impact so great that a credible threat of its use might 
mean that it would never have to be used. Targeted sanctions are appropriate as part 
of a comprehensive strategy aimed at restoring democracy. Obviously, if non-
democracies continue to trade and interact with the coup regime, this will limit 
sanctions’ effect. However, if the democracies are united and clear in advance about 
what they will do, the deterrence should usually be more than sufficient.
Military Intervention to Protect Democracy 
The most controversial assistance is armed intervention. Collective rather than 
unilateral military intervention remains the best approach. The key lies in deferring to 
the U.N. Security Council whenever possible, in order to reinforce its effectiveness.12
That said, there might be cases when intervention without Security Council approval 
would be justified. But those who intervene without UNSC approval should agree to 
submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and be
prepared to defend the legality of the intervention in a court of competent 
jurisdiction.13 The question is: Who is to decide and by what process is the 
justification established? Interventions must be subject to international law and be 
subjected to an independent tribunal.
Clearly, armed intervention should be a credible last resort that would be carried out 
in the unlikely case that other measures, including sanctions, failed. There are two 
bases for intervention -- by invitation and by prior treaty. Both are more legally 
defensible than intervention justified on humanitarian grounds.
- Military Intervention by Invitation. Intervention by invitation is exactly that --
intervention in response to an invitation for military assistance from the threatened or 
deposed democratic government. In fact, if the invitation is from the government 
recognized as the de jure government, then there is not really an “intervention,” per 
se. Some controversy surrounds intervention by invitation,14
11 See the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, para. 205.
especially where the 
12 See ICISS (2001) The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa, IDRC. See also C. Sampford (2001) “Challenges to 
the Concepts of 'Sovereignty' and 'Intervention'” in B. M. Leiser and T. D. Campbell (eds) Human rights in 
philosophy and practice , Aldershot, England , Ashgate.
13 C. Sampford (2001) “Challenges to the Concepts of 'Sovereignty' and 'Intervention'”.
14 L. Doswald-Beck, (1985) “The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government,” 
British Yearbook of International Law, 56: 189–252.
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argument, a regime that is firmly in control of the territory of the state -- i.e., the de
facto regime -- would be the only entity able to give such consent.  For some,
however, such a presumption is less persuasive where “a small, repressive military 
clique overthrows a popular and democratically elected government.”15
- Mutual Intervention Treaties. It is axiomatic that clear and credible commitments 
to intervene made in advance are more likely to be effective deterrents than the 
vague possibility of intervention after the occurrence of a coup. If organized by prior 
agreement between democratically elected governments16, intervention treaties will 
serve to increase the predictability of military intervention -- by providing an 
agreement to it in advance in a bilateral or, preferably, multilateral treaty. This 
approach also gets over the legitimacy question. 
Intervention treaties among democracies to protect their members from
unconstitutional overthrow would set out all the responses likely to occur, with an 
emphasis on:
- Recognition policy.
- Support for ousted institutions.
- Enforcement of the orders of democratically legitimate courts.
- Smart sanctions.
- Refusal of international credit.
- Refusal to recognize sovereign borrowings by coup regimes.
- Nonrecognition for the purposes of international trade.
- Ultimately, general sanctions and military intervention.
Such treaties also should create a new legal tribunal, or empower an existing one17,
to determine the legalities of actions taken in pursuance to the treaty, with signatories 
agreeing to be bound by the decisions of the tribunals. 
Some may wonder whether democracies will be willing to enter into mutual
intervention treaties. In robust liberal democracies -- those with the greatest capacity 
and resolve to support democracies at risk -- such action must take into account 
popular will. Leadership at home is thus as crucial as international leadership, given 
that the greater the strength of the commitment, the less likely the commitment will be 
called upon.
A countercoup strategy might therefore contain the following elements:
- Making the military a loaded weapon primed to explode in the hands of those who 
attempt to turn it on the State.
- Encouraging the establishment of an international military profession with 
internationally agreed-upon professional standards for military training and conduct, 
15 D. Wippman, (2000) “Pro-democratic Intervention by Invitation,” in Fox and Roth, Democratic Governance 
and International Law, Cambridge University Press, pp. 293–327, at p. 299.
16 For example, members of a regional organization.
17 This tribunal could be the ICJ or a new tribunal established by treaty to regulate interventions among the 
signatories. The latter could be more specifically tailored but inevitably would have jurisdiction limited to those 
who were party to the instrument establishing it. Preferably, a reformed ICJ at the apex of all such tribunals.
8according to which those who staged coups would be shunned as pariahs as 
forcefully as would be a doctor who murdered patients for personal gain.
- Making the State more difficult to take over by making it unresponsive to illegal 
direction, “to make it wither at the touch of the traitor.”
- Encouraging like-minded states to be more active in providing real help for fragile 
democracies, rather than accepting the outcome of coups (in particular, by having 
diplomatic and trade relations with usurpers).
- Ensuring that development assistance encourages institution-building and the 
development of a strong civil society in countries likely to suffer coups.
Outline of an Anti-erosion Strategy 
The response to erosions of democracy will necessarily be different from the 
response to coups d’état, although some of the mechanisms suggested above for 
dealing with the overthrow of elected governments might be applied to prevent 
erosion in democratic regimes as well. The key issue with respect to erosions is that 
the government in question initially had democratic legitimacy, and the point at which 
such legitimacy was lost is not always clear. Such a context inevitably shifts the kind 
of response taken by the international community more toward the “softer” end of the 
spectrum of options: for example, using aid to bolster democratic institutions, 
especially the courts, the media, and civil society, and encouraging a commitment by 
governments to legality.18
In some senses, an anti-erosion strategy might be seen as nothing more than a 
“good governance” strategy. Most of the strategies that integrity institutions and civil 
society pursue to preserve and enhance good governance are of real value in 
preventing the erosion of democracy. This is not surprising, given the links between 
corruption, coups, and the erosion of democracy. The erosion of democracy is a
particular example of the abuse of power for political gain. So if all those institutions 
that seek to prevent the abuse of power in general are doing their job, that should, in 
theory, be sufficient.
To some extent, the domestic strategy for preventing the erosion of democracy is 
merely a matter of developing, strengthening, and defending what Transparency 
International calls “integrity systems.”19 An “integrity system” is the set of institutions, 
practices, and values that promote integrity and inhibit corruption (no single institution 
being sufficient20
18 See Chapter Six for more on this topic.
). Such institutions include an independent judiciary with the power 
of judicial review, legislation protecting freedom of information, a freely elected 
parliament with broad scrutiny powers, independent auditors, a public service 
committed to the rule of law and a strong ethical concern with the public interest, anti-
corruption agencies, specific agencies to protect the public from abuses by officials, a 
free press, active civil society organizations, and public support for the values 
underlying such institutions. The various institutions, working more or less in the 
19 J. Pope, ed., The TI Source Book (Transparency International, 1996, 1st edition; most recent edition 2000); 
available at www.transparency.org/sourcebook/index.html.
20 See C. Sampford et al. Australian National Integrity Systems Assessment, Queensland Pilot, (Melbourne: TI-
Australia, 2001), pp. 1–4. 
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to attack or capture because there is no single institution and no single office to 
target.
Preventing the erosion of democracy should not be merely an implied goal of a 
nation’s integrity system. Some specific measures should be taken domestically and
supported internationally drawing on the countercoup strategy, damning the erosion 
of democracy by analogy to coups and emphasizing the importance of defending 
some of the key pillars of the integrity system. Where the same measures protect 
against coups and erosions, then their support is likely to be bolstered (e.g., those 
who do not see their country as likely to fall to a coup may be prepared to support 
measures that prevent erosion and vice versa).
The ‘Good Coup’
Some erosions of democracy are so severe that it might be argued that they provide 
justification for a coup -- and, of course, some regimes toppled by coups were never 
democratic to begin with. This raises two questions: Whether a coup can ever be 
good, and if the measures listed above would stop them. 
The reply to the first is that, whatever theory of the “good” is chosen, very few coups 
would qualify, after taking into account their effects.21 A coup may simply oust a 
wicked government, establish the conditions for free and fair elections and return to 
barracks. However, the better the coup, the greater the “burden of gratitude” to the 
coup-makers, and the more likely that it will be used as a precedent in the future.
Thus an apparently good coup will generally be followed by several bad ones. Since 
military coups emerged as a disease of the modern sovereign state, only two qualify 
as “good coups” -- Portugal in 1974 and Mali in 1992, both of which initiated 
democracies that subsequently took root.22
In answer to the second question, the measures outlined will be more effective in 
democratic countries. This is particularly the case with the kind of systematized 
international support suggested, which would only be offered to democracies.23
If it were possible to remove forever the possibility of coups, the benefits of doing so 
would outweigh the costs. Nations do better if authoritarian regimes fall by other 
means -- even if it takes longer. When a junta leaves office humiliated and 
discredited, the military is unlikely to be a significant threat to the junta’s legitimate 
21 There are probably more coups that would have been good if they had succeeded – including, almost certainly, 
the coup which the German military planned if Chamberlain had been prepared to oppose Hitler on 
Czechoslovakia. The ultimate results of a successful version of the 1944 plot are not so clear given the fact given 
the demands for unconditional surrender and the likelihood of a second ‘stab in the back’ theory emerging.
22 Note that the Portuguese coup was followed by failed rightist and leftist coup attempts which discredited 
future coups. This was also aided by the opportunity for entry to the EU and the inspired path to democracy 
established in its neighbour by King Juan Carlos (who anticipated and defeated a coup attempt in 1980).
23 Some may object that this might amount to a democratic version of the Concert of Europe or the Brezhnev 
doctrine – ‘once a democracy always a democracy’ or, as Kofi Anan said at the first meeting of the Community 
of Democracies “wherever democracy has taken root, it will not be reversed.” The difference is that all regimes 
claim to speak on behalf of the people of that state – with a variety of dubious claims being determined by force 
of arms rather than numbers of votes. However, no military regime can trump the claim of those who have 
actually been chosen by the people they would claim to represent.
10
successors. The final stage of such humiliations often occurs when the military 
refuses orders to fire on protestors demanding the departure of the government --
marking an exit by the military, rather than a further intervention.
Conclusion
Despite an undeniable evolution of international law towards the protection of 
democratic regimes, the international community, through the United Nations, is still 
plagued by tensions between human rights -- such as the right to participatory 
government -- and national sovereignty. 
In a democracy, those judgments must ultimately be made by the relevant ministers 
in the government. But choices there are -- as the Burkean quote indicates. 
Countercoup strategies are dependent on “good men” and women standing against 
the coup and daring to treat it as legally ineffective. Most of the effort has to come 
from within the country subject to the coup. But much can be done by the 
international community to help, and it is incumbent on other democratic nations to 
support those courageously prepared to resist coups, rather than leaving them, as 
Burke so eloquently and poignantly put it, to “fall, one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in 
a contemptible struggle.” Even under current international law, a sizable group of 
democratic states, by joining together in mutual support, could make coups history, at 
least among its membership. 
